SF Password Hijack Highlights Importance of Process in City, State IT

slfisher 0 Tallied Votes 428 Views Share

Claiming he was protecting San Francisco city government's computer system from incompetent coworkers, computer engineer Terry Childs changed the system's passwords and then for more than a week refused to give them to anyone, even after being arrested.

Childs was under four felony counts for blocking administrative access to the computers that handle 60 percent of the city's data systems, including law enforcement, payroll, and jail records. He was arrested July 13, and refused to give the passwords to anyone until July 21, with his attorney claiming his coworkers had, with both malice and incompetence, damaged the computer system and putting it in jeopardy. At that point, he agreed to give the passwords only to mayor Gavin Newsom.

According to a statement from his attorney Erin Crane, "He was the only person in that department capable of running that system. There have been no established policies in place to even dictate who would be the appropriate person to hand over the password to."

Bad grammar aside, what's wrong with this picture?

First, there's the aspect of not having processes and chain of command in place to take care of this problem. Second is the aspect of a single person having a password to any computer system, industry or government. Regardless of whether an organization needs to answer to constituents or stockholders, it's foolish to put that level of control in the hands of one person. Criminal activity aside, what if Childs had been hit by a bus? At least Newsom was able to go to the jail and retrieve the passwords from him.

Yet it's not unusual for computer people in government jobs to have a great deal of power with little oversight -- and sometimes disastrous consequences. Former Arkansas governor and Republican presidential candidate reportedly ordered the destruction of a number of hard disks when he left office, though he was exonerated of any crime. Canyon County, Idaho, IT department employee Marcus Young was kept on the payroll for more than a year while investigators tried to determine whether he had child pornography on county systems -- their care no doubt related to the fact that he was the son of the county prosecutor at the time. And Ron Harris, a computer programmer for the Nevada Gaming Control Board, reportedly stole thousands of dollars from casinos by programming "back doors" into gaming machines.

It's a challenge because a password that's too freely available is as bad as no password at all -- especially if, as Childs' attorney contends, his coworkers were incompetent. (Though if that's the case, perhaps he should have worked on that problem? Typically governments have "whistleblower" laws in place that protect employees from disclosing such issues.) At the same time, as in the rest of government, it's important to have checks and balances.

Dani AI

Generated

rightly pinpoints the two failure modes that make incidents like this catastrophic: missing process/governance and concentration of privileged knowledge in a single individual. Framed correctly, the problem is not only “who knows the password” but that the organization had no auditable, testable mechanism to operate, recover, or escalate when that person was unavailable or uncooperative.

  • Inventory and authority map: maintain a current list of all privileged functions (network, auth, backups) and the authorized roles that can perform them; include escalation and delegation rules.
  • Privileged access controls: store credentials in an auditable vault with check-out/check-in, session recording, and automatic rotation.
  • Break-glass / emergency access: implement pre‑approved, time-limited emergency procedures that require logged justification and dual approval when practical.
  • Separation of duties and least privilege: remove single-user “all-powerful” accounts; use role-based access, MFA, and temporary elevation for tasks.
  • Change control and two-person signoff: require logged approvals for configuration and routing changes that affect critical systems.
  • Cross-training and runbooks: keep up-to-date runbooks and rotate personnel through on-call duties; run recovery drills so knowledge isn’t siloed.
  • Logging, monitoring, and immutable audit trails: centralize logs off-system and retain them for investigations and compliance.
  • HR/legal alignment: codify access handover, immediate deprovisioning for departures, and clear consequences for noncompliance.

Start remediation with a quick risk assessment and two fast wins: an authoritative inventory and an emergency-credential vault. Technology alone won’t fix governance; policies, leadership buy-in, and regular testing are required to make the controls effective and enforceable.

slfisher 0 Posting Whiz

Clarification: Childs was holding passwords to the network routers.

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