Black Hat reveals credit data via RFID insecurity

newsguy 0 Tallied Votes 405 Views Share

The Black Hat security conferences are always good for a crowd pleasing demonstration or two, and security researcher Adam Laurie was happy to oblige at the latest DC based event. In a 'look no hands' fashion, he was able to pull up account data including name, account number and expiration date from an AMEX credit card and display it on the big screen to the attending masses, without actually removing the card from the wallet of the man who owned it.

Yet this was no trick, but rather a demonstration to get a debate started on the potential security weakness of the RFID smart-chip-enabled technology implemented on some credit cards these days. Laurie combined some simple hardware with a Python-based script to performing his magic. The impact was lessened a little by the fact that the account number shown on-screen was not the one embossed on the card itself and cannot actually be used to make an online transaction. Indeed, American Express has confirmed that this 'alias' number alone would not be accepted as transactionally valid and numerous other security mechanisms would need to kick in to authenticate the payment authorisation. As such, all that was demonstrated here was the potential ease with which data can be read from smart-cards using RFID scanning techniques, without any actual physical contact.

With close on 50 countries around the world using RFID enabled passports, many places also opting for RFID enabled public transit cards and so on, the security implications are still worrying. In Spain, there are apparently even some operations where users can get a RFID tag implanted under the skin. One such application being a beach resort which allows bars and shops to scan your wrist for payment, yet you can enjoy the beach and sea without requiring a wallet.

As always though, convenience needs to be balanced with confidentiality and as the Black Hat demo proves perhaps this particular angle of the RFID transaction is not being given as much serious thought as it should.

Dani AI

Generated

As noted, researchers demonstrated at Black Hat that contactless/EMV-capable cards could be interrogated with inexpensive hardware and open tools — the author of the proof‑of‑concept released a CHaP.py test module describing that work. (seclists.org)

Technical context and what changed since 2008: early contactless implementations sometimes exposed static fields that could be read by a nearby reader, but modern EMV/contactless protocols use cryptographic, per‑transaction values (authorization cryptograms) and widespread tokenization to prevent replay and cloning in real transactions. Academic and industry analyses explain how dynamic cryptograms and scheme/issuer controls reduce the practical attack surface compared with the pre‑EMV era. (en.wikipedia.org)

Practical, actionable steps (reflecting ’s point that issuers differ): check for the contactless symbol on the card, call the issuer and ask whether the contactless interface exposes a PAN or a token/DPAN and whether contactless transactions generate dynamic cryptograms; request a non‑contactless or reissued card if the issuer confirms static PAN exposure. When not using a card, a shielding sleeve or an RFID‑blocking wallet can reduce casual reads, but tests have shown variable effectiveness across products, so treat blocking sleeves as a modest, complementary control rather than a guarantee. Also enable instant transaction alerts and report suspected fraud immediately — card networks and issuers provide zero‑liability protections where terms apply. (creditcardscanada.ca)

For merchants and integrators: follow current contactless acceptance standards and PCI guidance (for example, the PCI Contactless Payments on COTS standard) and require terminals to enforce EMV processing rules to minimize fallback to weaker flows. That combination of terminal configuration, issuer cryptography, and monitoring is the best defense against the kinds of probes shown at the conference. (pcisecuritystandards.org)

waltaugust 0 Newbie Poster

I can do this on my Chase blink card too. On the Chase card it is the same number as on the front of the card.

This can be blocked by keeping the card in one of the Identity Stronghold sleeves that he shows on his website rfidiot.org

Why don't the credit card companies just send out the sleeve with their cards?

SNIP

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