Blackmail virus returns with an 'uncrackable' 1024-bit encryption key

happygeek 0 Tallied Votes 326 Views Share

Kaspersky Lab is warning the public at large to be on the lookout for a new version of the blackmail virus Gpcode which has started to appear in the wild. This particularly nasty twist on the virus format encrypts your files using an RSA encryption algorithm, this time with a 1024-bit key. In order to get your file access back, the virus author offers to sell you a decryption tool. Straightforward blackmail for the digital age, and if those files are critical to your work or contain vital personal data then you might just consider giving in and paying up.

Kaspersky, of course, has seen Gpcode before. In fact, it has managed to thwart the efforts of the virus authors in previous versions by cracking the private encryption keys using in-depth and time consuming cryptographic analysis of the RSA algorithm implementation. The last time around a 660-bit key was used, which Kaspersky says would take a single 2.2Ghz PC some 30 years to crack alone. Unfortunately, in the two years that have followed, the author has tweaked his code to fix previous errors which allowed that analysis to take place and added a 1024-bit encryption key which Kaspersky has been unable to crack so far.

Unless any errors are found it is, to be honest, unlikely that a key of this length will be cracked. Which means that if you do get infected, and if your files do get encrypted, then the only decryption option would appear to sit with the virus author who has that private key to do the unlocking with.

Kaspersky specialists recommend that victims contact them by email to if they get infected, using another computer, and tell them exactly what they were doing in the five minutes before infection and the exact time and date of infection. Kaspersky also stresses that users do not restart or power down the infected computer.

"We urge infected users not to yield to the blackmailer, but to contact us and your local cyber crime law enforcement units" a Kaspersky spokesperson told me "yielding to blackmailers only continues the cycle."

Dani AI

Generated

Following and answering : this variant is not a simple “password in a file” case — it’s a hybrid encryptor that makes ordinary cracking impractical. Technical analysis shows the malware encrypts each file with a symmetric cipher (RC4), then encrypts that per-file key with an RSA public key embedded in the binary. The result is an encrypted copy plus deletion of the original, so recovery depends on undeleting the originals (if possible) rather than factoring the RSA modulus. (See the technical writeup by Eran Tromer.)
Kaspersky’s writeup and advisories explain the same behaviour.

Immediate, practical steps (keep evidence, don’t rush to reinstall or pay):

  • Isolate the machine from networks but keep it powered if you can preserve volatile data. Document what you see (screens, ransom notes, filenames). Follow standard incident‑response order‑of‑volatility: collect RAM, running process lists and network state before powering off. NIST’s incident‑response guidance covers this sequence. (See NIST SP 800‑61.)
  • Make a full forensic image of the disk and work from copies. Example (Linux):
    dd if=/dev/sdX of=/mnt/usb/image.dd bs=4M conv=sync,noerror

    Acquire RAM with a memory‑capture tool (FTK Imager, WinPmem) before imaging if possible.

Recovery approaches that worked in 2008:

  • Because the trojan creates the encrypted file then deletes the original, undelete tools can often recover raw files if the disk blocks haven’t been overwritten. Kaspersky recommended using PhotoRec on an image and then their StopGpcode utility to restore filenames/paths — run these only against an image, not the live infected volume. (Coverage of Kaspersky’s PhotoRec/StopGpcode approach is available.)
    (See the Computerworld summary and Kaspersky guidance.)

Do not pay as a first or reliable option; law‑enforcement and national guidance discourage ransom payments and recommend reporting incidents to appropriate authorities. Maintain offline, verified backups and test restores — that’s the only reliable defense against file‑encrypting extortion. (See CISA/CISA/Federal guidance on ransomware.)

References: Eran Tromer’s analysis (technical details), Kaspersky Securelist (vendor writeup), Computerworld (recovery steps), NIST SP 800‑61 (incident‑response order of volatility), and CISA guidance on ransomware.

Jenova 0 Newbie Poster

Hmm... No doubt the password is hidden in this one as well.

Any information regarding the method used?
Furthermore, a file?

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